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I. INTRODUCTION 
While Americans are living longer, older age increases the 
likelihood of needing nursing home care.  Approximately forty-
three percent of people over the age of sixty-five spend at least 
some time in a nursing facility.1  Yet with the cost of nursing home 
care for one year averaging $55,000 in 2002,2 few Americans can 
afford to pay for nursing home care for more than a few months.  
For married couples, the cost of an extended nursing home stay for 
one spouse can deplete the couple’s lifetime savings, impoverishing 
the other spouse. 
In 1988, Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage 
Act (“MCCA”), which included revisions to Medicaid law to prevent 
the impoverishment of spouses of nursing home residents.3  These 
provisions, known as “spousal impoverishment” rules, govern the 
allocation of income and resources between the institutionalized 
spouse and the spouse living in the community.4  The purpose of 
the spousal impoverishment provisions of MCCA was to protect the 
community spouse, typically the wife, from being forced into 
poverty as a result of the overwhelming cost of nursing home care.5 
In the 2001 term, the United States Supreme Court reviewed 
one of the provisions of MCCA regarding the asset limit for a 
couple when one spouse resides in the nursing home and the other 
lives in the community.  The case of Wisconsin Department of Health 
and Family Services v. Blumer6 involved a challenge to the state’s 
procedure for allocating income and assets between the spouses.  
The federal Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
gave the states wide latitude to interpret the law in the manner least 
costly to the state.7  In a decision highly deferential to the 
interpretation of the federal government, six Justices disregarded 
 
 1. Enid Kassner, Foreword to WILLIAM H. CROWN, ET AL., AARP, AN ANALYSIS 
OF ASSET TESTING FOR NURSING HOME BENEFITS, at i (1994). 
 2. AARP, BEYOND 50.02: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON TRENDS IN HEALTH 
SECURITY 87 (2002), 
 http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/graphics/pdfs/beyond50_02three.pdf 
[hereinafter BEYOND 50.02]. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §  1396r-5 (1994 Supp. V.). 
 4. Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Family Serv. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, ___, 
122 S. Ct. 962, 966 (2002). 
 5. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(II), at 65 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
857, 888. 
 6. 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 966. 
 7. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the clear language and legislative history of MCCA.8  The Court 
permitted the federal agency to ignore one of the protections for 
community spouses contained in Medicaid law.9  The willingness of 
the High Court to disregard statutory protections for elderly 
spouses and to defer to the interpretation of the Medicaid statute 
by government agencies seeking to minimize their Medicaid 
budgets reflects a lack of judicial will to protect the rights of the 
poor. 
II. AN EXTENDED NURSING HOME STAY FOR ONE SPOUSE 
FREQUENTLY IMPOVERISHES THE OTHER SPOUSE 
A.  Most Older Americans Require Medicaid Assistance to Finance 
Nursing Home Costs of More Than a Few Months 
In 1900, life expectancy in the United States was forty-six 
years.10  In 1997, the average American lived 76.5 years.11  In the 
twentieth century, the rate of growth of the elderly American 
population greatly exceeded the growth rate of the population of 
the country as a whole, and people eighty-five years and older were 
the fastest growing segment of the elderly population.12 
The likelihood of needing long-term care in a nursing home 
increases with age.13  As chronological age increases, people have a 
greater probability of having multiple chronic illnesses, therefore 
requiring longer stays in nursing homes.14  While the American 
population is living longer, many elderly people “live their 
increased years with multiple illnesses and disabilities.”15  In 1990, 
almost a quarter of Americans eighty-five years of age and older 
 
 8. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 980 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. 
 10. ARTHUR KORNHABER, CONTEMPORARY GRANDPARENTING 10 (1996). 
 11. DONNA L. HOYERT ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
47 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 19, 1 (1999). 
 12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, SERIES P23-194,  POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997 50 
(1998). 
 13. See generally Joshua M. Wiener et al., Catastrophic Costs of Long-term Care for 
Elderly Americans, in PERSONS WITH DISABILITITES 196 (Joshua M. Wiener et al., eds., 
1995) [hereinafter Catastrophic Costs] (discussing costs of elder care). 
 14. FRANK B. HOBBS & BONNIE L. DAMON, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, P23-190, 
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:  65+ IN THE UNITED STATES 3-14, 3-17, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23-190.html. 
 15. Id. at 3-14. 
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resided in nursing homes, and ninety percent of all nursing home 
residents were over sixty-five years of age.16 
Few Americans can afford to spend more than a short period 
of time in a nursing home.  At well over $50,000 per year and 
increasing with the rapid inflation of health care services, the cost 
of living at a nursing home for a long period of time would 
bankrupt most older Americans.17  Neither Medicare nor private 
health insurance covers any substantial degree of long-term care 
services.18  Medicare covers primarily short-term stays (100 days or 
less in a benefit period) in skilled nursing facilities following a 
hospital stay.19  Private long-term care insurance accounts for less 
than one percent of the financing for long-term care.20  Only a 
small percentage of the wealthiest Americans have purchased 
private long-term insurance policies that pay for long-term care in 
nursing homes.21 
Approximately seventy percent of nursing home residents rely 
on Medicaid to help pay for their nursing home care.22  More than 
one million individuals received Medicaid assistance in paying for 
nursing home care in 1996.23  Medicaid, a jointly financed state-
federal program designed to pay a portion of health care costs for 
needy persons of all ages, is the largest source of public financing 
for nursing home care in this country.24  Indeed, Medicaid is “our 
nation’s primary response to the long-term care needs of its 
 
 16. Id. at 3-14, 6-9. 
 17. Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent long-Term Care 
Policy Trends, 12 J.L. & POLITICS 195, 210 (Spring 1996). 
 18. Wiener et al., supra note 13, at 182-83. 
 19. Id. at 182. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See generally ENID KASSNER & LEE SHIREY, AARP, MEDICAID FINANCIAL 
ELIGIBILITY FOR OLDER PEOPLE: STATE VARIATIONS IN ACCESS TO HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER AND NURSING HOME SERVICES 1 (2000), available at 
http://research.aarp.org/health/2000_06_medicaid_1.html (stating few older 
individuals have purchased private long-term care insurance policies that pay for 
these services). 
 22. JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS, STATE COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES 
FOR OLDER PEOPLE, CRS-1 (2000) [hereinafter STATE COST CONTAINMENT], available 
at newfederalism.urban.org/health_policy.html; JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., AARP, 
SPENDING DOWN TO MEDICAID: NEW DATA ON THE ROLE OF MEDICAID IN PAYING FOR 
NURSING HOME CARE 1 (1996) [hereinafter SPENDING DOWN]. 
 23. KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at 11. 
 24. Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 
42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 724 (1991). 
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citizens.”25 
Medicaid has stringent income and asset limits that exclude all 
but the poorest Americans.  However, due to the exorbitant costs of 
nursing home care, many older Americans become impoverished 
when they require extended long-term care.  While the elderly are 
not a majority of this country’s impoverished citizens, older persons 
are much more likely to become impoverished by nursing home 
costs.  Not only are older Americans more likely to require nursing 
home care, but also the fixed incomes and limited earnings 
potential of older Americans make it harder for them to recover 
from the financial blow of nursing home expenses. 
Approximately 9.7% of the nation’s poor in 1999 were over 
age sixty-five.  In addition to the older Americans living below the 
poverty level, many elderly households are just above the brink of 
poverty.  In 1999, 6.1% of people sixty-five years of age and older 
were just above poverty but below 125% of poverty.26  An additional 
20.1 % of people over age sixty-five were between 125% and 200% 
of the poverty level.27  The elderly are less likely than other adults to 
move out of poverty, due to the fixed nature of elderly incomes.28 
Similarly, the elderly are less likely than younger adults to be 
able to replace the assets that they spend.29  So, if an elderly couple 
spends almost all their assets on nursing home care for one spouse, 
there is little likelihood of replenishing those assets to support the 
other spouse. 
Most elderly couples do not possess sufficient assets to pay for 
even a year of nursing home care for only one spouse.  Excluding 
the value of home equity,30 the median net worth for married 
couple households over sixty-five years of age in 1995 was $47,741.31  
 
 25. KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at 1. 
 26. AARP, BEYOND 50: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 28 
(2001), http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/2001home.html [hereinafter BEYOND 
50]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 30; HOBBS & DAMON, supra note 14, at 4-16, 4-21, 4-22. 
 29. HOBBS & DAMON, supra note 14, at 4-23. 
 30. The home is an excluded asset in determining Medicaid eligibility.  
SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 28; 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b)(1)(2002); 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-5(c)(5) (2002).  Therefore, in determining whether a couple is eligible for 
Medicaid, the state will not consider the value of the couple’s home.  After the 
death of both spouses, federal law permits the state to seek recovery of its 
Medicaid expenditures, including seeking reimbursement from real property that 
had been owned by the institutionalized spouse, such as the couple’s residence.  
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2002); 42 C.F.R. § 433.36 (2002). 
 31. MICHAEL E. DAVERN & PATRICIA J. FISHER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  U.S. DEP’T 
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Minority households, specifically black and Hispanic households, 
have significantly less assets than white households and are even 
less able to afford the steep cost of nursing home care.32 
Middle class people who have been financially independent all 
of their lives often begin their stay in nursing homes paying on 
their own for their care.  In 1993, about one-half of nursing home 
care expenses were paid out of pocket by older Americans.33  If 
older persons are discharged in a few months, they often do not 
seek Medicaid eligibility.  Yet, if their care lasts longer, many 
residents are forced to spend a lifetime of savings, impoverishing 
themselves prior to obtaining government assistance to pay for 
their care.34  Indeed, due to the spend down requirements of 
Medicaid, beginning in 1985 and continuing afterwards, the 
average older person spent more personal money, both in absolute 
dollars and as a percentage of income, on total heath care than she 
did prior to the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.35 
Nearly all individuals with disabilities prefer home and 
community based long-term care services to nursing home care.36  
An AARP survey of persons age fifty and older conducted in 2001 
found that seventy-five percent of the people surveyed preferred to 
receive care in their homes, in the event of a disability requiring 
help with everyday activities.  A significant minority of fifteen 
percent would prefer care in an assisted living or similar residential 
setting.  Only four percent of the people surveyed stated that their 
first choice for receiving care would be a nursing home.  Even 
when asked about a disability requiring twenty-four-hour care, 
twenty-five percent of respondents preferred care in the home, 
 
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: HOUSEHOLD NET WEALTH AND ASSET 
OWNERSHIP: 1995 at  xvii tbl. I (2001), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/popula.html at P70-71.  Additional data 
regarding net wealth and asset ownership, as it fluctuated between 1995 and 1998, 
can be found in the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances.  See 
generally ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, RECENT CHANGES 
IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: RESULTS FROM THE 1998 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 
Fed. Reserve Bull. (January 2000), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0100lead.pdf (clicking 
search, entering “recent changes in U.S. family finances,” and selecting paragraph 
5 on search results page). 
 32. DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 31, at xv fig. 6; BEYOND 50, supra note 26, at 
46; HOBBS & DAMON, supra note 14, at 4-25. 
 33. Catastrophic Costs, supra note 13, at 183. 
 34. See SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 19. 
 35. Kapp, supra note 24, at 726. 
 36. KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at 13; Kapp, supra note 24, at 728. 
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twenty-three percent would seek care in an assisted living setting, 
and only twelve percent desired nursing home care.37 
However, Medicaid coverage of home and community based 
long-term care services is optional for the states, and in many 
locations, the financial eligibility criteria for such services are even 
more restrictive than they are for nursing home coverage.38  
Medicare does not cover long-term care in the home, and only a 
small number of the wealthiest Americans have purchased long-
term care insurance to provide assistance with the costs of long-
term care in the home.39 
Long-term care services in the home are quite expensive.  The 
median basic rate for assisted living ranges from $21,600 to 
$26,300, including meals but excluding transportation, assistance 
with medication, and therapy.40  The average cost of a home health 
aide in 2002 was eighteen dollars per hour, while a licensed 
practical nurse charged an average hourly rate of thirty-seven 
dollars per hour.41 
Many households expend their savings purchasing home- and 
community-based care.  For example, most moderate and low-
income persons age seventy-five and older can not afford assisted 
living unless they use their assets to help pay for the costs.42  Two 
studies of spend down patterns for long-term care found that even 
more people exhaust their assets on home- and community-based 
services than do so for nursing home care.43  Many people who 
receive Medicaid in nursing homes have already exhausted their 
assets to obtain community based care.  Since community-based 
care is highly preferred over nursing home care, it is unlikely that 
people with large amounts of wealth would seek nursing home care 
before spending considerable resources on home- and community-
based care. 
The overwhelming majority of nursing home residents who 
spend down their assets to qualify for Medicaid are age sixty-five 
and older.44  One commentator observed: “Impoverishment 
resulting from extended nursing home stays has, in effect, become 
 
 37. BEYOND 50.02, supra note 2, at 57. 
 38. See KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at ii. 
 39. BEYOND 50.02, supra note 2, at 58. 
 40. Id. at 88, 117 n.144. 
 41. Id. at 87, 117 n.141. 
 42. STATE COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 22, at CRS-14. 
 43. SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 28. 
 44. Id. at 19. 
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a normal risk of aging.”45  Another commentator remarked that 
“the vast majority” of elderly Americans “are at an appreciable risk 
of exhausting their life savings to cover an extended stay” in a 
nursing home.46  Medicaid is “a substantial safety net” for middle 
class people who are impoverished by the high costs of long-term 
care.47 
B.  After the Death of the Institutionalized Spouse, the Surviving 
Spouse is Likely to Have Decreased Income as well as Depleted 
Assets 
Individuals who die while in nursing home care are 
significantly more likely to have experienced longer nursing home 
stays than those who are discharged alive.48  Therefore, the 
economic situation of the surviving spouse is especially precarious 
after the death of a spouse who was institutionalized in a nursing 
home.  The couple probably expended significant assets on nursing 
home care for the institutionalized spouse, and the surviving 
spouse’s income is likely to decrease dramatically after the 
institutionalized spouse’s death. 
Women tend to live longer than men and are more likely to be 
the surviving spouse.49  In 1999, thirty-two percent of women over 
age fifty-five were widowed compared to only nine percent of men 
of comparable age.50  As women age, the likelihood that they will be 
widowed increases rapidly.  Seventy-seven percent of women eighty-
five years and older are widows.51  The average period of 
widowhood (i.e. the average number of years a woman lives past the 
death of her husband) is eleven years.52  After the death of her 
husband, a woman needs sufficient income and assets to sustain 
her for an average of eleven years. 
 
 45. Catastrophic Costs, supra note 13, at 183. 
 46. Rein, supra note 17, at 254. 
 47. SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 29; STATE COST CONTAINMENT, supra 
note 22, at CRS-1. 
 48. Catastrophic Costs, supra note 13, at 196. 
 49. DENISE SMITH & HAVA TILLIPMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: MARCH 1999 1 (2000), http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-
532.pdf at P20-532.  In 1999, the ratio of men to women age 55 and over was 81 
men to 100 women.  The male-female ratio drops steadily with age.  For Americans 
age 85 and over, the male-female ratio was 49 men to 100 women.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 3. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Rein, supra note 17, at 218. 
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The poorest segment of the elderly population is comprised of 
unmarried (or widowed) women, and the likelihood of 
impoverishment increases with age.  In 1999, 13.4% of unmarried 
women over sixty-five years of age lived in poverty, as did 9.7% of 
unmarried men over sixty-five.  In contrast, approximately five 
percent of married couple families sixty-five and over lived in 
poverty.53  Women who are widowed are at a much higher risk of 
living in poverty. 
Both older men and women living alone (most of whom are 
widowed) have significantly fewer assets than older married 
couples, likely reflecting the spending of those assets on medical 
care or long-term care for the spouse who died.54  While married 
couple households over age sixty-five had a median net worth 
(excluding home equity) of $47,741 in 1995, single men over age 
sixty-five had a median net worth of $15,374, and single women 
over age sixty-five had a median net worth of $11,100.55  Thus, after 
the death of a spouse, the surviving spouse has few assets to finance 
his or her own medical and long-term care. 
Moreover, after the death of an institutionalized husband, the 
wife’s pension and Social Security benefits are likely to be 
inadequate to meet her needs.  “[T]he average household income 
of married women falls sharply in the United States when their 
husbands die, even when income measures are adjusted for the 
reduced consumption needs of the now smaller household unit.”56 
Fewer women than men receive an annuity or pension, and 
the average pension amount is significantly lower for women than 
for men.  In 1995, 46.4% of men over age sixty-five received annuity 
and/or pension income averaging $11,460, compared to only 
26.4% of women over age 65 who received an annuity or pension, 
with an average pension of $6,684.57  While widows constituted the 
largest proportion of women over age fifty receiving annuities 
and/or pensions, “widows received the lowest mean and median 
 
 53. SMITH & TILLIPMAN, supra note 49, at 5. 
 54. See Cathleen D. Zick & Karen Holden, An Assessment of the Wealth Holdings 
of Recent Widows, 55 J. GERONTOLOGY: SOCIAL SCIENCES S90, S96 (2000) (discussing 
finances of the elderly population). 
 55. DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 31, at xvii tbl. 1. 
 56. Karen C. Holden & Cathleen Zick, Insuring Against the Consequences of 
Widowhood in a Reformed Social Security System, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
DEBATE 157 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998). 
 57. KEN MCDONNE ET AL.,  EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EBRI 
DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS G3 (1997). 
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annuity and/or pension amounts of women of any marital status.”58  
Census Bureau data from 1990 to 1992 show that only fifty-nine 
percent of the widows of pensioners received any post-widowhood 
pension and post-widowhood pension income was seventy-one 
percent of the husband’s pre-widowhood pension income.59  Also, 
since private pensions usually are not indexed to inflation, real 
pension income declines over time.60 
In addition, Census Bureau data show that Social Security 
benefits declined by almost forty percent from the pre- to post-
widowhood period among women widowed during the early part of 
the 1990s.61  For a single-earner couple, during the lifetime of the 
working spouse, the retired worker receives a Social Security 
retired-worker benefit, and the nonworking spouse receives a 
benefit equal to fifty percent of that amount.  After the death of the 
retired-worker spouse, the widow will be paid a benefit equal to the 
deceased worker’s benefit, which amounts to only two-thirds of the 
combined pre-widowhood benefit.  For a two-earner couple in 
which the spouses have identical covered-earnings history, after the 
death of a spouse, the surviving spouse receives only her own 
retired-worker benefit without any additional payments to 
compensate for the loss of the deceased spouse’s benefits.  For this 
two-earner couple, the post-widowhood Social Security income is 
only half of the pre-widowhood income.62 
In order for a widow to maintain the same standard of living as 
when both spouses were alive, she needs to receive eighty percent 
of the couple’s pre-widowhood income.63  However, most widows 
do not receive eighty percent of the couple’s income, since both 
their pensions and Social Security incomes drop dramatically after 
the death of the spouse.  As a result, “many married women face a 
significantly increased risk of poverty following the death of their 
husbands.”64 
III. MCCA INCLUDED A “RESOURCES FIRST” RULE, DESIGNED TO 
PROTECT THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE’S ASSETS, BUT SOME LOWER 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Holden & Zick, supra note 56, at 166. 
 60. Rein, supra note 17, at 253. 
 61. Holden & Zick, supra note 56, at 165-66. 
 62. Id. at 159. 
 63. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact of Social Security 
Reform on Women’s Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375, 384 (1999). 
 64. Id. 
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COURTS DISREGARDED ITS MANDATE 
A.  Congress’s Intent in Enacting MCCA was to End Spousal 
Impoverishment 
The legislative history of MCCA demonstrates that in 1988 
Congress sought to redress the devastating financial impact of 
nursing home costs on the community spouse.  The House Report 
states: 
The leading cause of financial catastrophe among the 
elderly is the need for long-term care, especially the need 
for nursing home placement.  The expense of nursing 
home care—which can range from $2,000 to $3,000 per 
month or more—has the potential for rapidly depleting 
the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest . . . .The 
purpose of the Committee bill is to end this pauperization by 
assuring that the community spouse has a sufficient—but 
not excessive—amount of income and resources available 
to her while her spouse is in a nursing home at Medicaid 
expense.  This will be of particular benefit to older 
women, who, in the current generation at risk of nursing 
home care, have often worked at home all their lives 
raising families and have limited income other than their 
husbands’ pension checks.65 
The House Report noted that the inadequate maintenance 
levels for community spouses had forced community spouses to sue 
the institutionalized spouses for support, and that in some cases the 
“financial duress” of the low maintenance levels had resulted in 
“the premature institutionalization” of the spouse who had been 
residing in the community.66  The Report continues: 
The Committee bill would end spousal impoverishment.  It 
revises the current Federal requirements relating to 
attribution of income, attribution of resources, transfer of 
resources, and post-eligibility application of income.  
These revisions are limited to the context of a couple with 
one spouse in an institution who applies for or receives 
Medicaid.  The purpose of these revisions is to assure that 
the community spouse in these circumstances has income 
 
 65. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(II), at 65 (1988) (emphasis added), reprinted in 
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 888. 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(I), at 69 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 892. 
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and resources sufficient to live with independence and 
dignity.67 
The Senate expressed similar concern for the plight of spouses 
of nursing home residents and its intent to remedy spousal 
impoverishment.  In discussing the conference report on MCCA, 
Senator Kerry was especially concerned about couples who had 
sought court orders of support for the community spouse through 
the divorce courts, utilizing the divorce process in order to protect 
the community spouse from impoverishment.  Senator Kerry 
stated: 
I am also very pleased that the conference report 
addresses the issue of spousal impoverishment and 
contains much needed protections against asset and 
income depletion.  There is absolutely no reason why a 
couple married for 30 years must even consider getting a 
divorce to protect the wife’s income and assets while the 
husband impoverishes himself to qualify for Medicaid 
funded nursing home care.  This is immoral–this is not 
America–this is an abomination.  And, this legislation will 
eliminate the need for its consideration.68 
The many statements of support in the Senate for MCCA’s 
spousal impoverishment provisions included the statement of 
Senator Reid: 
Spousal impoverishment is a very serious national 
problem.  The term “spousal impoverishment” refers to 
the far too familiar situation affecting many, many older 
couples.  It occurs when a spouse enters a nursing home, 
for example, and the couple must forfeit their entire 
savings to qualify for Medicaid coverage.  This is a 
significant statement, Madam President.  A person enters 
an extended care facility, a nursing home, and the couple 
must forfeit their entire savings to even qualify for 
Medicaid coverage.  The act now before us provides for 
protection for the non-institutionalized persons whose spouse’s 
nursing home costs are being paid for by Medicaid.69 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. 135 CONG. REC. S7386, S7408-S7409 (daily ed. June 8, 1988) (statement of 
Sen. Kerry). 
 69. Id. at S7402 (statement of Sen. Reid) (emphasis added). 
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B.  MCCA Provides for the Community Spouse to Retain Resources 
During the Initial Application Period if Her Income is Below a 
Minimum Level 
MCCA sought to protect the community spouse by ensuring 
that she retained sufficient income and resources to avoid 
impoverishment.  Prior to MCCA, the couple could own no more 
than $2,000 in resources in order for the institutionalized spouse to 
receive Medicaid.70  MCCA revised Medicaid law to permit the 
community spouse to retain a greater share of the couple’s 
resources.  Under MCCA, the community spouse is permitted to 
retain half of the couple’s resources up to a specified limit, known 
as the Community Spouse Resource Allowance (CSRA), while the 
institutionalized spouse is required to spend down his or her share 
of the couple’s assets to the $2,000 amount.71  The exact amount of 
CSRA is set by the state, but must be within the minimum and 
maximum levels established by federal law and indexed with 
inflation.72  In 2001, the minimum CSRA was $17,400 and the 
maximum CSRA was $87,000.73  More than half the states set their 
CSRA at the minimum level permitted by federal law.74 
An example will clarify how the CSRA works.  Assume the state 
has chosen the minimum CSRA (for 2001) of $17,400, and the 
husband is the institutionalized spouse.  Our hypothetical couple is 
presumed to own $50,000 in non-excluded resources (just above 
the average).75  Since the couple’s resources exceed the $17,400 
CSRA chosen by the state, $25,000 will be attributed to each 
spouse.  The husband will be entitled to Medicaid benefits 
(focusing on resources only) when his share of the resources is 
reduced to $2,000.  Thus, the couple must expend $23,000 of the 
husband’s designated resources on the nursing home care of the 
husband before he will be eligible for Medicaid. 
MCCA also contained provisions to protect the income of the 
community spouse.  The community spouse is allocated a 
Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance (“MMMNA”), 
set by federal law at a minimum of 150% of the federal poverty 
 
 70. Rein, supra note 17, at 217. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c), (d), and (f) (2002); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (2002). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 968. 
 74. WILLIAM H. CROWN ET AL.,  AARP, AN ANALYSIS OF ASSET TESTING FOR 
NURSING HOME BENEFITS, at 45 (1994). 
 75. DAVERN & FISHER,  supra note 31, at xvii tbl. I. 
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level for a family unit of two plus a possible excess shelter allowance 
(if the community spouse can establish the need for the 
allowance).  The maximum MMMNA was set at $1,500 in the 
original 1988 law.76  For 2001, the maximum MMMNA was $2,175 
per month.77  States set the actual MMMNA between the federal 
minimum and maximum amounts.78  A majority of states set the 
MMMNA at the minimum amount permitted by federal law.79 
If the community spouse’s income is insufficient to produce 
income equal to or exceeding the MMMNA, then the couple may 
request a fair hearing and seek to keep additional assets to 
generate additional income and bring the community spouse up to 
the basic income level of the MMMNA.80  The revision of the CSRA 
to generate additional income is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
5(e)(2)(C), which states: 
Revision of community spouse resource allowance.  If 
either such spouse establishes that the community spouse 
resource allowance (in relation to the amount of income 
generated by such an allowance) is inadequate to raise the 
community spouse’s income to the minimum monthly 
maintenance needs allowance, there shall be substituted, 
for the community spouse resource allowance under 
subsection (f)(2), an amount adequate to provide such a 
minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance.81 
The Blumer case concerned whether the revision of CSRA 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) is mandatory.82  Irene 
Blumer was institutionalized in a nursing home and sought 
Medicaid benefits to pay for her care.83  Her husband, Burnett 
Blumer, resided in the community, and his income was twenty-five 
dollars below the minimum income level of the state MMMNA.84  
The Blumers contended that the state was required to revise the 
CSRA as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) to permit 
Burnett to retain additional resources to generate the minimum 
income of the MMMNA.85 
 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3)(c), and (g) (2002). 
 77. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 967. 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3). 
 79. CROWN, supra note 74, at 46-49. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C). 
 82. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 964. 
 83. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 970. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972-73. 
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The state of Wisconsin, supported by the federal agency, HHS, 
sought to utilize a different procedure to make up for the shortfall 
in Burnett’s income.86  The state’s approach would allocate income 
from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d), instead of permitting the 
community spouse to retain additional resources to generate the 
additional income.  This approach is known as “income first,” 
allocating income before increasing the CSRA.  The Blumers’ 
approach is known as “resources first,” in which the CSRA is 
adjusted before allocating income from the institutionalized spouse 
to the community spouse.87 
The “resources first” approach permits couples to obtain 
Medicaid eligibility sooner, because they do not have to expend as 
much of their resources to qualify under the resource limit.88  
Under the “income first” method, the couple must expend more 
resources to qualify for Medicaid.89 
Importantly, after the death of the institutionalized spouse, the 
community spouse is much more likely to be impoverished when 
an “income first” method is utilized as compared to the “resources 
first” method.  The “income first” rule forces the community 
spouse, most commonly the wife, to spend down the couple’s assets 
and live on her husband’s income during his lifetime.  Yet, after the 
husband’s death, his pension or Social Security income, or a 
significant portion of it, may no longer be available to her.90  As a 
result, the “income first” rule greatly increases the risk that the 
community spouse will be impoverished after the death of the 
institutionalized spouse.  In contrast, the “resources first” rule helps 
to reduce the pauperization of the community spouse, since it 
preserves assets for her support after the institutionalized spouse 
has died.  Thus, the “resources first” rule is consistent with the 
purpose of MCCA, i.e. to protect the community spouse from 
impoverishment. 
However, from the vantage point of the government, the 
“income first” approach is desirable, because it results in lower 
Medicaid expenditures.  In the Blumer case, the federal 
government’s brief projected that the additional annual cost of the 
 
 86. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 970. 
 87. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 969. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See supra Part II.B. 
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“resources first” method for Wisconsin was $10 million.91  The state 
and federal government both contribute to the payment of 
Medicaid expenditures.  Not surprisingly, given the predicted 
additional costs, a majority of states utilized the “income first” 
approach when the Blumer case went before the Supreme Court.92 
C.  Some Lower Courts Ignored the Plain Language and Legislative 
History of MCCA in Upholding the “Income First” Approach 
Medicaid applicants in numerous states challenged states’ use 
of the “income first” method.  Applicants argued that the CSRA 
adjustment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) occurs during 
a fair hearing process that determines initial eligibility, while the 
attribution of income permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) is 
applicable only after the applicant is found eligible for Medicaid.  
The section pertaining to the attribution of income states: 
Protecting income for community spouse. (1) Allowances 
to be offset from income of institutionalized spouse.  After 
an institutionalized spouse is determined or redetermined to be 
eligible for medical assistance, in determining the amount of 
the spouse’s income that is to be applied monthly to 
payment for the costs of care in the institution, there shall 
be deducted from the spouse’s monthly income the 
following amounts in the following order:  (A) A personal 
needs allowance. . . .(B) A community spouse monthly 
income allowance. . . .93 
Therefore, applicants argued, according to the clear language 
of the statute, the attribution of income from the institutionalized 
spouse to the community spouse could not be utilized to deny 
initial eligibility and could only occur after the institutionalized 
spouse was found eligible for Medicaid.  In other words, applicants 
contended that the “resources first” approach was mandated by the 
statute. 
 
 91. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae (on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari) at 11, Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 
473, 122 S. Ct. 962 (2002) (No. 00-952).  The Blumers’ answering brief disputed 
the government’s estimate of the cost of the “resources first” method.  The 
Blumers challenged the assumptions underlying the government’s calculations, 
and the Blumers asserted that the government’s estimates were greatly 
exaggerated.  Respondent’s Brief In Opposition (on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari) at 9-10, Blumer (No. 00-952). 
 92. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 11. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) (2002) (emphasis added). 
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Two federal courts of appeals and two state courts rejected the 
applicants’ arguments in support of “resources first” and upheld 
the legality of the states’ “income first” method.94  The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that the “resources first” 
approach would render the allocation of income set forth in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) “superfluous.”95  The Third Circuit’s decision 
did not address the statute’s scheme of requiring adjustment of 
resources prior to an eligibility determination and limiting the 
attribution of income in section (d) until after a finding of 
eligibility.  By ignoring the timeframe set forth in the statute for 
adjusting resources pre-eligibility and attributing income post-
eligibility, the Third Circuit was able to conclude that the “income 
first” method was permissible.96  Moreover, the Third Circuit 
deferred to the opinion of the federal agency, HHS, contained 
merely in opinion letters and not in regulations, that “income first” 
was permitted by the Medicaid statute.97  The court opined that this 
result comported with the purpose of MCCA “by preserving as 
many Medicaid resources as possible.”98  The court stated that 
MCCA was not intended to be a final solution to spousal 
impoverishment, disregarding the legislative history of MCCA that 
stated Congress’ intent to end spousal impoverishment.99 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state’s 
highest court, similarly concluded that “income first” was permitted 
by the Medicaid statute.100  The Massachusetts court acknowledged 
that the attribution of income provision, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-5(d), applied “after” eligibility was determined, but then 
stated that the “fair meaning” of the statute was that the attribution 
of income was not limited “only” to post-eligibility 
determinations.101  Thus, the court ignored the plain meaning of 
 
 94. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 870 
(1999); Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 802 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998); Thomas v. Comm’r of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 
682 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Mass. 1997); Golf v. New York State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 697 
N.E.2d 555, 662-63 (N.Y. 1998). 
 95. Cleary, 167 F.3d at 809. 
 96. Id. at 809-12. 
 97. Id. at 811-12. 
 98. Id. at 811. 
 99. Compare id. at 810, with H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(II), at 65, 69 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 888, 893. 
 100. Thomas, 682 N.E.2d at 879. 
 101. Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Randolph, 374 Mass. 437, 440-41 (1978)).  The 
Court of Appeals of New York similarly stated that the federal statute did not 
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the word “after” and disregarded the text limiting income 
attribution to the post-eligibility period.102  The Massachusetts court 
acknowledged that “the income deemed to the community spouse 
from the institutionalized spouse was not guaranteed on the death 
of the latter,” but concluded that permitting the community spouse 
to retain resources would “subvert” the “purpose of MCCA, which 
was to require couples to bear a reasonable amount of the cost of 
institutionalized care and thus preserve Medicaid resources.”103 
Like the Third Circuit, the Massachusetts court was more 
concerned with lowering Medicaid expenditures than with ending 
spousal impoverishment.104  Neither court cited any passage of 
MCCA legislative history in support of their characterization of the 
purpose of MCCA.105  The courts’ statements that the goal of the 
spousal impoverishment provisions of MCCA was to preserve 
Medicaid resources is factually incorrect; so, it is not surprising that 
the courts do not cite any passage of the MCCA legislative history in 
support of their claim. 
Nevertheless, Congress did seek to dramatically reduce 
Medicaid expenditures when it passed the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (“OBRA 1993”).106  In hearings before 
the Health and Environment Subcommittee of the United States 
House of Representatives’ Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
the chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Waxman, made 
this objective clear.  Congressman Waxman stated that the Clinton 
administration had requested that the Committee reduce federal 
Medicaid outlays by $7.8 billion over the next five fiscal years, 
dwarfing the $2.9 billion in cuts in 1981 under President Reagan.107  
 
specify whether an income transfer was to occur prior to an eligibility 
determination or post-eligibility, ignoring the word “after” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
5(d). 
 102. Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied upon Thomas in 
reaching the conclusion that a transfer of income may occur prior to an eligibility 
determination.  Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 145 F.3d 793, 802 (6th 
Cir., cert. denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998)).  The Court of Appeals of New York similarly 
stated that the federal statute did not specify whether an income transfer was to 
occur prior to an eligibility determination or post-eligibility, ignoring the word 
“after” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Golf v. New York State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 697 
N.E.2d 555, 562 (N.Y. 1998). 
 103. Thomas, 682 N.E.2d at 880-81. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Chambers, 167 F.3d at 793; Thomas, 682 N.E. 2d at 880-81. 
 106. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). 
 107. Ira S. Wiesner, OBRA ‘93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability, 
and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679, 683-84 n.18 
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To accomplish this goal, OBRA 1993 increased the number of 
months of ineligibility for transferring assets, placed restrictions on 
wealth sequestered in trust arrangements, and enhanced state 
recovery of Medicaid expenditures from deceased Medicaid 
recipients’ estates.108 
Yet, OBRA 1993 made no changes to the procedures for 
revising the CSRA and attributing income, and therefore the 1993 
law is irrelevant to the question of whether the “resources first” 
method is required by MCCA.  The courts imputed the legislative 
history of OBRA 1993, specifically the objective of reducing 
Medicaid expenditures, to MCCA, but in fact, MCCA did not seek 
to diminish Medicaid spending.  The courts’ distortion of the 
legislative history and the clear terms of MCCA is best understood 
as judicial deference to governments seeking to expend less on low-
income seniors and as judicial insensitivity to the plight of older 
Americans who require long-term care. 
Three state courts, including the Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin in the Blumer case, held that the “resources first” 
approach was mandated by MCCA.109  All three decisions focused 
on the statutory language requiring a revision of the CSRA prior to 
a decision on eligibility and limiting the attribution of income until 
after a determination of eligibility.110  These decisions concluded 
that the unambiguous language of the statute mandates the 
“resources first” approach and does not permit the “income first” 
method.111 
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in two 
federal appellate cases which held that the “income first” 
 
(1995). 
 108. Id. at 681.  The long-term care industry lobbied for restrictions on 
Medicaid eligibility, alleging that wealthy elderly couples were using asset transfers 
and trusts to pass their wealth to their children without paying for long-term 
nursing home care.  The true motive behind the long-term care industry’s efforts 
was the desire to increase the sale of private long-term care insurance.  Rein, supra 
note 17, at 261.  As described supra, in Section I, most older Americans do not 
have significant resources to pass to their children, and indeed, the few who have 
such wealth utilize their resources to pay for home and community based long-
term care services. 
 109. Gruber v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 647 N.E.2d 861, 868 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1994); Kimnach v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 645 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1994); Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Family Serv. v. Blumer, 615 N.W.2d 
647, 655 (Wis. 2000), reversed, 534 U.S. 473, 122 S. Ct. 962 (2002). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
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procedure is permissible.112  Then the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in 
Blumer, which had held that the language of the statute mandated 
the “resources first” approach.113 
IV. IN BLUMER, THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE CLEAR 
LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF MCCA 
The majority opinion in Blumer, constituting the views of six of 
the Justices, was written by Justice Ginsberg.  The crux of the 
opinion is that the term “community spouse’s income” in 42 U.S.C. 
section 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) does not mean the income “actually 
possessed by” the community spouse.114  Instead, according to the 
majority opinion, the term “community spouse’s income” includes 
income that is possessed by the institutionalized spouse and 
attributed to the community spouse by the state.115  The Court did 
not even suggest that any specific language of MCCA or the 
legislative history of MCCA supported its dismissal of the plain 
meaning of the term “community spouse’s income.”116  Instead, the 
opinion listed two citations in support of its conclusion that the 
community spouse’s income includes the institutionalized spouse’s 
income.  First, the Court cited a treatise on grammar for the 
proposition that a “possessor nominal does not necessarily possess 
(in the everyday, legalistic sense of the term) the entity denoted by 
the possessee.”117  The second citation is to a prior Supreme Court 
case which “question[ed the] characterization of a statutory term as 
unambiguous when its meaning has generated a division of 
opinion in the lower courts.”118  In essence the Court ruled that 
since some, but not all, lower courts had ignored the plain 
meaning of the text, the text must be ambiguous. 
The Court acknowledged the argument that the statute 
requires the revision of the CSRA prior to a determination of 
 
 112. See Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
870 (1999); Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 802 (6th 
Cir.), cert denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998). 
 113. 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972. 
 114. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 115. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 974. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972 (citing J. TAYLOR, POSSESSIVES IN ENGLISH: AN 
EXPLORATION IN COGNITIVE GRAMMAR 2 (1996)). 
 118. Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 
(1996)). 
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eligibility but permits the attribution of the institutionalized 
spouse’s income to the community spouse only after a 
determination of eligibility.119  The Court responded by concluding 
that since the fair hearing would consider the post-eligibility 
situation of the couple, specifically whether the community spouse 
had a sufficient monthly income allowance to meet the MMMNA, 
therefore, the state could conduct the post-eligibility income 
attribution calculation prior to a determination of eligibility.120  The 
only case law cited by the Court in support of permitting post-
eligibility income attributions prior to a determination of eligibility 
was Schweiker v. Gray Panthers.121  The Court cited the case for the 
“background principle that ‘it is proper to expect spouses to 
support each other’” and quoted legislative history from the 
establishment of the Medicaid program in 1965.122  Thus, the 
Court’s decision completely disregarded not only the clear 
language of MCCA regarding pre- and post-eligibility 
determinations but also the legislative history of MCCA, which 
expressed Congressional intent to end spousal impoverishment. 
Moreover, the Court’s characterization of the legislative history 
of the original enactment of Medicaid is misleading.  In 1965, 
“Medicaid was simply tacked on as an afterthought to the Medicare 
program,” with virtually all debate focusing on the Medicare 
program.123  There was hardly any attention paid in 1965 to 
Medicaid coverage of nursing home care,124 and the Medicaid 
program was “part of a last-minute scramble to cobble together the 
Medicaid Act’s provisions” based on existing legislation, “which 
involved little or no debate.”125  The 1965 Senate Report described 
Medicaid as an extension and improvement of the Kerr-Mills 
medical assistance for the aged program, authorized in 1960.126  
Kerr-Mills had provided “some institutionalized care” for the 
elderly, while the 1965 “improvements” required coverage for 
skilled nursing home services.127  The 1965 Senate Report’s 
 
 119. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972-73. 
 120. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at  973-74. 
 121. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 974 (citing Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 
34, 45 (1981)). 
 122. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 78 (1965)). 
 123. Rein, supra note 17, at 257. 
 124. Id. at 258. 
 125. Id. 
 126. S. REP. NO. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1950, 2014. 
 127. Id. at 1951. 
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discussion of the obligation of spouses to support each other, cited 
by the Blumer court, did not contain any references to spouses 
residing in institutions, but rather applied to the entire Medicaid 
program.128  There certainly was no discussion in 1965 of whether 
income attributions to the community spouse would occur pre- or 
post-eligibility, since the income attribution provision was added to 
Medicaid in 1988, when Congress explicitly sought “to protect at-
home spouses from impoverishment.”129 
In sum, the Court ruled that the text of MCCA did not mean 
what the words said but rather its meaning was to be interpreted in 
accordance with the legislative history of a different statute than 
the one being implemented.  After dismissing both the text and 
legislative history of MCCA, the Court readily concluded that 
HHS’s preliminary determination that MCCA permits “income 
first” was “not . . . unreasonable.”130  The Court stated that HHS’s 
position, as embodied in proposed regulations that were not 
finalized, “warrants respectful consideration.”131 
The Court noted that since MCCA gave states “large 
discretion” in setting the MMMNA and the CSRA, therefore the 
statute did not indicate that additional discretion with regard to 
“income first” was “inappropriate.”132  The Court’s reasoning is truly 
frightening.  Many federal entitlement programs operate by giving 
states broad discretion with regard to some variables but requiring 
states to adhere to strict federal requirements in other matters.  
The High Court justified gutting the “resources first” provision of 
MCCA by noting that the statute deferred to state choice in other 
provisions of the statute.133  
Notably, the Blumer Court did not cite or rely on the case of 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, in which the Supreme Court had 
stated: “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”134  Instead, the Court 
cited United States v. Mead,135 Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,136 
 
 128. Id. at 2018, cited by Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, ___, 122 S.Ct. 962, 974 (2002). 
 129. Rein, supra note 17, at 258. 
 130. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 973. 
 131. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 976. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at___, 122 S. Ct. at 975. 
 134. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 135. 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). 
 136. 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
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and Schweiker v. Gray Panthers.137  As noted supra,138 Gray Panthers was 
decided before MCCA was passed, and therefore is of little 
relevance to the validity of the Secretary’s interpretation of MCCA.  
In Mead, the Court held that the Chevron deference was not 
warranted and remanded the case for consideration, pursuant to 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,139 of whether the agency’s position was 
persuasive.140  Yet, the Blumer majority did not state that the 
agency’s position permitting “income first” was persuasive.  The 
Blumer decision characterized the government’s position as not 
“unreasonable” and not “inappropriate.”141  A reasonableness 
standard is far more deferential to the agency than a persuasiveness 
standard, and thus the Court expanded upon prior precedent, 
granting the agency enormous power in interpreting legislation. 
Blumer cites Thomas Jefferson University for the proposition of 
deferring to the Secretary’s significant expertise in interpreting a 
complex and technical regulatory program.142  Thomas Jefferson 
University did not concern interpretation of statutory language but 
rather addressed the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, 
which the Court reviewed under the standard that the agency’s 
interpretation would be upheld unless it was “plainly erroneous.”143  
In Blumer, the Court extended the “not erroneous” or “not 
unreasonable” standard to the context of an agency’s 
interpretation of Congressional mandates and intent.144  
Interestingly, Thomas Jefferson University was a five to four decision, 
in which the dissent written by Justice Thomas derided the majority 
for ignoring the “plain meaning” of the relevant regulation.145 
Similarly, the dissent in Blumer, written by Justice Stevens and 
joined by Justices Scalia and O’Connor, criticized the majority for 
ignoring the plain text of the statute.  For instance, the dissent 
stated, “Rather than admitting that its reading strains the text of 
the MCCA, the Court engages in an analytical sleight of hand.”146  
The dissent also pointed out that the majority’s decision violated 
 
 137. Blumer, 534 U.S at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 976. 
 138. See supra, notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
 139. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 140. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-39. 
 141. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 973, 976. 
 142. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 976. 
 143. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512-13 (1994). 
 144. Id. at 525 (Steven, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Ginsburg joined the dissent.  See id. 
 146. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 978. 
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MCCA’s requirement that, post-eligibility, income is defined as 
“available” only to the spouse whose name is on the check.147  The 
dissent further noted that the majority expressed the opinion that 
the “income first” method is a better policy choice than the 
“resources first” method, and the dissent berated the majority for 
ignoring the policy choice made by Congress.148 
The majority stated that if states are required to expend 
greater funds on Medicaid for long-term care, due to the federal 
requirement to utilize the “resources first” method, then the states 
“would have little choice but to offset the greater expense of the 
resources-first method” by reducing expenditures on other 
recipients within the bounds of federal law.149  The Court further 
suggested that applicants “whose assets exceed the formula 
resource allowance” are not worthy of the expenditure of these 
funds.150 
The Court’s reasoning displays callous disregard for the 
impoverishment of older Americans, particularly older women, 
who lose a lifetime of savings when their spouses are beset by 
disabling impairments that require nursing home care.  The Court 
demonstrated insensitivity to the plight of many older Americans 
who are on the edge of poverty and are pushed into the chasm of 
despair by the exorbitant costs of long-term care. 
The Court did not provide any citations in support of its 
assumption that if states are forced to comply with the plain 
meaning of the statute they will “have little choice” but to penalize 
other Medicaid recipients, “by reducing the MMMNA or the 
standard CSRA.”151  The Court fails to consider that states have 
many other means of reducing Medicaid expenditures, such as 
cutting nursing home reimbursement rates, reducing the supply of 
nursing home beds, expanding the role of managed care and 
capitated payments to long-term care providers, and utilizing tax 
incentives to encourage people to purchase long-term care 
insurance.152 
The Court’s presumption that states will not spend additional 
dollars to prevent the pauperization of older Americans is self-
 
 147. Id. at 959 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(2)(A)(i)). 
 148. Id. at 979. 
 149. Id. at 976. 
 150. Id. at 976-77. 
 151. Id. at 976. 
 152. STATE COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 22, at CRS-15, CRS-19, CRS-22. 
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prophesying.  Now that the Court has ruled that states are free to 
reduce their Medicaid expenditures by ignoring the requirement 
to calculate “resources-first,” the Court has encouraged states to 
minimize their Medicaid expenditures without worrying about the 
plain meaning of the Medicaid Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The legislative history of MCCA included the expression of 
outrage at the need for spouses to become divorced in order to 
protect the financial survival of the community spouse.153  By 
eliminating the “resources first” rule from the Medicaid statute, the 
Blumer Court has increased the likelihood that couples will be 
forced to divorce in order for the community spouse to retain 
sufficient resources to provide a basic level of income to her after 
the death of her institutionalized husband.154 
In Blumer, the use of the “resources-first” approach would have 
meant an additional $15,000 in resources to be kept by Mr. 
Blumer.155  The additional economic assistance provided by a small 
increase in assets and income generated from those assets is 
essential to maintaining some measure of independence and 
dignity for the community spouse.  The Blumer decision is a 
disturbing development for all but the wealthiest Americans.  
Middle class citizens whose economic survival is contingent upon 
the protections of the Medicaid statute are clearly at risk of 





 153. See supra pp. 14-18. 
 154. See William J. Browning, Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision Will Lead to More 
Divorces Among the Elderly, PROBATE L.J. OF OHIO ___(forthcoming 2002). 
 155. 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972. 
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